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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Statement of the Problem
The natural sciences represent one of the
successful methods of compiling and utilizing
the world that man has ever found.
this since most of the

~ajor

the fields of industry,

~ost
knowled~e

o~

Few people would dispute

advances of this century in
medicine, and many

technolo~,

others have been made possible by the natural sciences.
Respect for the sciences as a method of solving problems
and generally dealing with difficult

tremendously, approaching adulation, in
civilized countries of the world.

has grown

~uestions

all the

al~ost

This respect is almost

invariably justified by pointing to the successes already
achieved by science, as one might expect.
might also expect concerning an area of

But what one
life

hu~an

,

consciously given such importance is intense and widespread
reflection on it in an

atte~pt

to deternine the reasons why

it is so successful, and what, if any, are its
Reflection on the

~ethod

li~itations.

of science has in fact been done

by at least two important groups - the scientists
themselves and the philosophers of science.

It is my

contention, however, that they have not for the

~ost

dealt with the questions of why science has had such
l

part
~reat

success and what its limitations as a 'llethod are.

It is

those two questions that will occupy the 11ajor parts of
this paper, bu"C. before takinP," the11 up I wan.._: to give more
careful attention to the scientists and philosophers of
science in an atte11pt to see what they have done.
B. Critique of ::>ome Qt.her Approa.ches
The efforts of the scientists and philosophers of
science have varied tre11endously depending on the aspect
of science they chose to study or the approach they adopted
for their study.

No one would say that the practicing

scientist is not concerned with the method of science, but,
his concern with it is for the most part very prac+,ica.l
and internal.

His position as an active, :functioning

scientist requires that he adopt this approach to his
science most of the time.

In any

~iven

experiment that a

scientist conducts he must be concerned with problems of
research t.echnique such as control groups, statistical
data verification, and so on.
is to

~

The nature of his endeavor

science, not just to talk about it.

But because

of that very fact he may not know much about his science.
Talking about something implies getting above it, or at
least out of it long enough to see it as a whole entity
relation to other entities.

The scientist as a workinp.

scientist is not involved in that kind of question.

The

techniques and methods he uses are not designed for that
2

!!l

type of

11

111eta-inquiry."

The scientist could conceivably

go through his entire professional career without ever
asking what the

of his science as a whole is.

~er-ninp

His

approach to his science as an independent research scientist
may not vary greatly from what it was as a bep.inninp. student
of the science.
Tho~as

Kuhn makes

~uch

the

sa~e

p9int as I have made

here in his discussion of the priority of paradigms in
Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

~

He points out that

once a scientist accepts a paradiFm as descriptive of his
area of science it is not necessary for

to deal with or

hi~

to justify .the first principles on which that
paradigm is based. 1 The paradigm of a given science ~ust

atte~pt

be accepted by the student of that science if he is to be a
student at all, but it is usually
career.

~P.intained

As the student proceeds from the

through to the doctorate, the scientific

throughout his

7resh~an
proble~s

level
~iven

to

him become 11ore complex and less precedented, but:: uthey
continue to be closely modeled on previous

achieve~ents

as

are the problems that normally occupy him during his
subsequent -independent scientific career. 112 -Kuhn is talking
here about what he calls "nor.nal" science which he says is
what most scientists do.

This involves working within an

ac'cepted paradigm rather than atte'Dpting to develop a new one
to ground the science on.

Kuhn does not deny that the latter

happens, but he does claim that it is rare and that most

science is "nornal" science.

rv:ore than that one can say

that scientists are in virtually all cases trained 1Q

~

nornal scientists since their teachers work within a
paradigm and teach that pa.radig11 as the proper way to
understand that science.
The endeavor of the scientist does not see11 to lend
itself to quel:ltions like "Why has scienc-e been so successful?" or "What are the limitations of science?"

This is

not leveled as a criticism of science, but is merely an
observation of the way science functions.

"Biolon- as a

science cannot be examined under the 11icroscope," as
Theodore Kisiel puts it.3

I do not intend to suggest that

the scientist as a man or philosopher cannot deal with
these questions, for he surely can, but the scientist .9:Ha
scientist cannot.
If this is the case, then, it see11s i11portant that
philosophy of science deal with questions about science
such as the reasons for and limitations on its success as a
method.

While there is already a. very strong school

o~

philosophy of science frequently referred to as "cornrnon"
philosophy of science,· it does not concern itself
ly with questions of this nature.
of science

fro~

An

exainple

o~

this school is Israel Scheffler.

su~ficient

a. philosopher
In his

book Science and Subjectivity he describes co11rnon philosophy
of science as that school whose position on the nature
science has "attained the status of a standard view. 114
4

o~

In the first chapter of his book Scheffler
nu~ber

of

re~arks

a

~a~es

which reveal what he thinks science is.

He describes science

RS

a "syste'Tlatic public enterprise,

controlled by logic and by e'Tlpirical

~act,

whose purpose

it is to fornulat.e the truth about the natural world. 115

The e'11phe:sis in Scheffler's discussion is on the objective
truth of scientific assertions.

He attempts to support

the belief that science does achieve such truth by appealing
to 11 independent and controlling standards" on research. 6
He feels that if the objective truth of science cannot be
'11aintained, then everything collapses into total arbitrariness.

While his argu1lent is open to attack on many fronts,

my point in !Dentioning it here is not to criticize it as an
argument but to show what co'11mon philosophy of science, as
it is conceived by Scheffler, concerns itself with.
an endeavor which

:~_aims

It is

at examining the structures of

scientific explanation with regard to their truth and
objectivity.

It does not attempt to show why science is

so successful, but only wants to prove that it is a true
account of nature.

Neither does it seek to es-tablish the

limitations on science.
Other writers in philosophy of science have similarly
limited the issues that they feel philosophy of science
should deal with.
Philosonhv

o~

In his introduction to Readinp:s in the

Science Baruch Brody mentions three basic

types of problems that he feels should be considered by
5

philosophy of science.

:'he first that he brinp.s up is the

significance that new scientific findinps 'lliP.'ht have f'or
tradition~l

philosophical issues such as t.he principle o+'

indeter~inacy in quantu'll mechanics. 7 Another type of'
question would be involved with the analysis of' basic
scientific concepts such as nu'llber, force, and so on. 8
:he third that he 1lentions concerns the goals and :nethods
the scientist should choose, i.e., should the scientist
explain or just describe, should he"postulate the existence
· -c··ti
o .+-. uno b served en
1
es.... 119 'lhe
~
s i gn i-"i
:I
cance O:.c- ques +·
..,ions
like these may be very great and, again, I do not wish to
argue against them, but only to point

ou~

that they do not

allow us to examine science as an entity or mode of knowing
in relation to other

~odes

of knowing.

They do not tell us

why science is so successful or what its limitations as a
method are.
C. Outline of a new Approach
As I indicated earlier the questions I want to answer
are, "Why has science been so success:'ul?" and ''What are
the limitations of science?"

The second and- third sections

of this thesis are intended to answer those

ques~ions.

The

second section offers an analysis of 'llodern science as
research in an

atte~pt

to

deter~ine

This should make easier discovering
the success of science.

its essential structures.
·so~e

of the reasons for

:lany of' -+:he argu""lents in this
6

)1•

section come fro'll an article by

~,,.,artin

!{

Reid~gger,

Age of the World View."

w

"The

The third section is an atte11pt, to trace the possible
I

development of the scientific or theoretical knowinp out
of 'llan's everyday involvement with the world around him.
This should provide an excellent perspective for comparing
these two 'llodes of knowinp. and being, the
the everyday

~odes.

scienti~ic

and

. II. MODER:i SCIENCE AS RESEARCH
A. The Projective tJa ture of Resear.ch
The position that science holds in modern society is
one that is greatly respected if not held in awe by most
people.

Science has that position

improve~ents

becau~e

of the incredible

in living standards, health, working conditions,

etc., that it has made possible.

Science has the reputation,

with good cause, of being the one discipline that successfully and consistently finds solutions to the problems it
sets itself.

But few people, including scientists and

philosophers of science, seem to understand just why science
is consistently so successful.

Could it have anything to do

with it's "setting its own proble;ns?"

Or is the 'nethod of

science appropriate for solving just any

proble~

that

~ight

be tossed up to it?
I intend here to give a rather extensive analysis of
the nature of modern science followinF the arguments given
by Heidegger in "The Age of the World View."

The reason

for doing this will be primarily to provide a basis for
deter'ninin~

the causes of success in the

scienti~ic

as well as the limitations of that ;nethod.
coatention that the success and the

method

It will be

li~itations

~y

of scieRce

are but two -nanifestations of the sarne characteristic that

'

sets science off frorn o':her 'DeT.hods o<'

gainJ~I' <nowledire.

Heidegger begins his discussion of
contrasting it brie:f'ly with Ancient, and

I

~i

I!'

~odern

science by

J'.~edieval

science.

I

While both of the latter ages had their scientists and
observers of nature, it is clear that they did not achieve
the success of science in our age.

The

of

charAc~eristic

modern science that most positively differentiates it from
that of earlier ages, according to Heidegger, is the fact
that it functions primarily in the mode of research.
are to understand

~odern

If we

science and the modern ape that is

so heavily influenced by it, we must carefully examine this
scientific research to see what its nature is.
The basic procedure by which research functions,
Heidepger says, is to delineate for study a field or sphere
of nature by projecting beforehand what that area will be.
The significance of this deciding

be~orehand

or

projectin~

exactly what is to be done will become clearer as the
discussion proceeds.

Not only does research procedure

decide in advance what area is to be studied, but it also
deter~ines

how that area should be approached.

While practicing research scientists may not overtly
recognize their work as a process of projecting, they do
refer to individual research endeavors as "research projects."
They are fully aware that if their work is to be called
"scientif ic 11 it must be rigidly control led fro:n the
beginnine: with respect to

~

9

it wishes to investigate, and

how it intends to proceed.

Any scientist

be consider-

ed unscientific, if not a fool, who described his research
project as an atte11pt .'!lerely to "find out about" "l'lice, for
l

exa'Dple, by "whatever 11ethod
ti~e.

11

occured to him at any given

He would be asked precisely what he wanted to know

about 11ice (the particular physiological effect
quantity

o~

o:

a given

a certain drur under stated conditions,

perha~s),

and precisely how he intend.ed. to go about getting this
infor~ation

equip~ent,

(method of administering +,he drug, necessary
coatrol group data, for example).

I~

he could

not give information such as this and in much preater
detail than I have suggested here, his colleagues would
simply dismiss what he wanted to do as something other than
science or at least as inadequate and unacceptable research
procedure.

Wb~t

his plan lacked was precisely what makes

"research" of modern science and differentiates it from
Ancient and Medieval science.

It lacked the definite and

precise projection of the sphere of nature that was to be
investigated, as well as a definite and precise formulation
of how that investigation would proceed.

The possibility

of his gaining scientific knowledge in such -a :nci.nner would
be mini11al if not non-existent.
The above example of the way working scientists approach
their research projects is given to help ground

~any

o~

the

assertions I will 11ake at the functional level of science.

10

B. The Mathematical Nature of Research
Heidegger recognized, as Kant had bef"ore him, that the
uniqueness· of 11odern science as well as the key to its
success lay
ai~s

at

i~

its method.

gainin~ knowled~e

knowledFe.

As a 11ethod modern science
o7 nature, but not just any

It knows before it begins to

what it wants to know from it.

examL~e

nature

It is this fact that pro:npt-

ed Heidegger to call the sciences "mathematical" in a sense
that was not applicable to Greek and Medieval science.
Both Greek and r;ledieval scientists stud.led nature.

'!'hey

made careful, often precise observations and some even
e:TJployed

~athematical

measurement in their observations. But

they still were not mathe11atical

~

sciences the way Heidepger

claims modern science as research is.

He clPrified this

assertion with a discussion of the :TJeaninp of the mathematical as it arose with the Greeks.

':'he mathematical essential-

ly is "that which man knows prior to his observation of
things: of bodies - the corporal; of plants - the vegtative;

•••• " e t c. 10
Heidegger further discusses the mathematical in What
is a Thing.

There he points out that while numbers are

commonly identified with the mathematical, they are only
one example of it.

Numbers are indeed 11athe11atical, but

only because they represent something we can know about
things prior to our observation of them. 11 If we encounter
11

three objects together we know immed_ia tely that there are
three of the:n.

We :nay have no idea what they are, but prior

to experiencing them this possibility of knowledp.e about
the11 was open to us.
The mathematical is that which allows us to experience
things as things at all, or as these particular things.
:his is rele¥ant to all types of knowing, but the sciences
have grasped it as a presupposition of knowinp more
deliberately than any other field of knowledpe.
research does not
it.

,.,

11

Science as

11erely observe'' nature in order

~o

l<:now

It recog!lizes that in order to know nature with

certainty it rnust observe nature .f'rom this or that precise
point of view, but no other.

Mere opservation allows for

the collection of unlimited amounts of random data, but
random data is precisely what science does not aim for.
All research scientists, in their laboratory work, are
concerned with the variables that may effect their results.
Those variables must be reduced to an absolute mini11u11 if
the results are to be reliable.

Often the only variable

left in the experi11ent is the one that the project was
designed to determine.

But merely observing-the world

would be to see everything that occured as yet another
variable.

In scientific research mere observation si11ply

h's no pl2ce.
Heidepger chooses

~odern

physics to demonstrate what he

means by the "mathe1la.tical" nature of natural science.
12

Physics, he says, projects nature as the "self-su:'"'ficien+,
kinetic relation of points of mass in space and ti11e. 111 ?.
This constitutes what HeidegP."er calls a "blueprint o""'
nature, 111 3 and given this blueprint all natural event.a are
"deter:nined in advance as spatioternporal kinetic magnitudes. 1114
The projection of natural events in

ter~s

of magnitude

~akes

the use of nu:nber and calcµlation appropriate as a :'1'.lode o:'"'
describing those events.

llli!, as indicated above, the use

of number and calculation is not what gives physics its
:nathematical nature.

~he

fact that physics projects nature

as the realm of nu:nberable and nalculable events and studies
it only under that aspect makes it mathe:natical.

The pro-

jection of nature could have involved entirely different
categories that had nothing at all to do with number, and
it would still have qualified for the title of mathematical

physics.
The concept of "exactness" in the mathe'1latical sciences
follows from their mathematical nature understood in the
sense above.

The advantages in learning that the sciences

gained by projecting nature under a certain aspect in order
to achieve certain knowledge within the bounds of that
projection would have been lost if the procedure of their
actual research had not. adhered strictly to the projection
or blueprint with which it began. ·This strict adherence
to the initial projection of nature is what exactness
meant in this context for Heidegger.

13

The exact calculations

of physics do not of the11selves rnake it an exact science.·
It is exact because it proceeds precisely as

i~

says it

will in the blueprint or ground plan of nature it lays
down initially.
Exact :neasurement and exact calculation are, incidentally, exact for the same reason that
is exact.

~hysics

as a science

A measure.11ent is exact if it appeals to a

de:f'in'ite standard and does not deviate fro'll it; a calculation is exact if its method is clearly stated and adhered to
in practice. _ In each case what is to be done ('Tl easurinp
or calculating) is llnderstood in advance, and if this is
strictly adhered to the process is exac+,.

While the

Greek or Medieval scientists may have e.'Tlployed exact
measure11ent in their science, their science as a whole was
not exact.

The measurement itself employed a standard

and adhered reliably to it, but the science as a whole did
not.

It merely observed.
It would be an oversifht to discuss modern science as

research

wi~hout

makin~

reference to scientific experiment.

The actual, individual experiment is not something over
and above research, but is in essence the primary vehicle
of it. ·A given

experi~ent

may be designed to either

confirm or deny some particular aspect of the larger
projection of nature accepted by :he science as a whole, or
it may be intended to "flesh-out" that projection in the

sense that Kuhn uses when he speaks of puzzle solvinp in

14

,.
I•:

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 1 5
In any case the individual

experi~ent

f{

1·'.'

I!'

will invariably

have the characterist'ics described for research thus far.
I

It will.rely on the general projection of nature

accep~ed

by this discipline, and it will adhere very strictly to
that projection in its procedure.

Otherwise it would

neither be considered exact nor scientific.
Heidegger points out that while the ancient Greeks
were very keen in their observation of nature they did"!Jnot
do experimen~ in the sense of ~odern research. 16 They may
have used

~easurement

or

instru~ents

to assist in their

observation, but they did not begin their observation with
an assumed blueprint of nature that was to be verified or
denied through their observations.

Merely

observin~

nature,

regardless of how careful or accurate those observations
are, does not constitute science as research.

c.

The Institutional Nature of Research
Another characteristic of science that follows

fro~

the procedure of research as it has been described. thus
far is called "busy-ness 11 by Heidegger. 17
A science can
be said to have aquired the character of busy-ness when
it becomes necessary to establish institutes to control
the research that goes on in that science.

Once the

science in question has adopted a particular projection
of nature as the area of knowledFe appropriate to it, it

15

~ust

control the research that is done if it is to master

that area.

But the work that is to be done in the future

will alway_s be dictated by the results of research done
in the past.
The point to be emphasized is that the projective
nature of· science as research ul t,imately becomes the
architect of the organizational whole of the science
involved.
conferences

Institutes, foundations, publications, and
~ust

all be created in order to facilitate

the exchanr-e of information on what research has been done,
and to determine and control the research that must be
done in the future.
The fact that institutes, publications, etc., develop
for any given science is an indication that it is "taking
possession of its own real nature. 1118

By "its own real

nature" Heidegger means the projective nature of research..
The deliberate use of past results to determine new areas
for research amounts to adopting the procedure of projection
as virtually the only guiding force for the science.

This

means that the procedure of research as the projection of
-

nature under a certain paradif.'rl'l, to use Kuhn's term, has
reached its lopical conclusion.

The purpose

o~

the science

in question is to fully understand all of nature under this
paradigm.

In order to do this it must

determL~e

and direct

all future research on the basis of past and present
research that were also controlled by the paradig:n.
16

In

order to acco:nplish the tas1< of completely "f'leshinp-out,"
the paradigll SOile overriding structure for

science must be adopted, and this usually takes the
of the con:erences, institutes, and so

'the

directin~

~on

~orth,mentioned

abov.e that facilitate information exchanpe and dictate
what is to be done in the future.
At this point, Heidegger asserts, the procedure of
research has been "granted definite precedence over Beinp ••• ,
which research makes objective.• 1 9 Nature, which constitutes
the

real~

of being for the natural sciences, is now under-

stood by those sciences as the totality of objects available
~or

study according to an acceptable projection.

The

bein~

and individuality they once had is lost to the science that
now trea"ts the11 as "obj ectifiable en ti ties" only •.
D. The Applicability of Research to Other Areas of Knowledpe
The determination of the being and truth of nature for
the natural sciences can only be accomplished

~hru

the

procedure of research which is their 'Tlethod of knowing.

In

order for understanding to be achieved at all, nature 'llust
be subsu'lJed under the categories provided by the paradigin
or projection accepted by the science involved.

In no

other way cari the objects of nature even be said to exist.
"Only what thus beco'Tles an object JJ!, is recognized as
existent.

Science as research occurs only when it is in

this objectification that the being

17

o~

the existent is

r,

sought. 1120

With this quotation and

following it Heidegger

sentencJ.~ i~mediately
j!I.

two points.

~alces

First he wants

to say that existence for science lies in objective
l

representation of a thing, and secondly that truth lies in
the certainty of that representation.
He further suggests that this conception of beinp and
truth was first, found iri +.he metaphysics of

Descar~es.

The

following will be an atte11pt to show the relationship
between

~he ~ethod

of modern science as projection and

Descartes' metaphysics.

So~e

Heideggerian points will be

used.
Early in

Descar~es'

investigation of being and truth

in the Meditations he determined that the only thing of
whose existence he could be absolutely certain was
the ego.

hi~self,

Once that deternination was accepted he began to

investigate the possibility of deternininf the existence o""
other things in the world.

Only those things would be

accepted as existent whose being he could know with certitude.
Through this process Descartes had effectively placed ine.n at
the center of all that is as that entity who could ·bestow
"the seal of being 1121 on other en ti ties.
The significance of this approach to being and truth is
that for Descartes the world was not
opened himself, but, rather, it was
determined for himself.
certitude to

so~ething
so~ething

to which he
that he

If a thing can be represented with

man-~he-ultimate-subject

18

it can be said to

exist.

I~

it is not available to such representation its

existence remains open to doubt.
For the first

ti~e

in the history of

hu~an though~

was in a position to challenge and interrogate nature.
was no lonrer

~erely

open to experiencinF it.

become the ultimate subject with
so~e

relation in order to exist

who~

~

man
He

He had

nature had to be in

all.

He would ask of

nature the questions he wanted answers to instead of accepting the random data offered to him by nature.
For the first time man began to realize what value the
"if-then" hypothetical statements could have if.. applied to
the investigation of nature.
nature

fro~

He saw that

1f.

he viewed

a particular perspective, then he could reach

conclusions about nature that would be conditioned only by
the limitations of the original

g. Thus was the "hypoth-

esis" of modern scientific research born.
fhe men of science began to see that if their
conclusions were to be in any sense certain, they had to
exclude any evidence or factors which were not certain or
reliable.

This consideration required that they project in

advance precisely what types of evidence they would admit,
and systematically exclude all others in the course of their
investigation.

Through this procedure they were able to

obtain from nature exactly the answers they wanted and no
others.
The reasons for the success of this method should be

19

I•

'

r1iF

made as clear as possible.

There can be no 1aoubt that

the success is limited,

it is precisely because it is

li~ited

w

b~t

-

that it is successful at all.

---,

The genius of the

method lies in the fact that it deliberately chooses a
perspective and

syste~atically

that perspective and no other.

investigates

na~ure

from

Only data appropriate to

that perspective is collected, and the conclusions reached
are valid within the

li~its

of the initial projection or

perspective (assuming, of course, that the projection is
rigidly adhered to throuphout the investigation).
But, since few people of the

~odern

age question the

fact that the scientific method is success:f'ul, we should
here

e~phasize ~he

limitation of that success.

And the

limitation of any science lies in the projection of nature
that it starts with.

It is a hypothetical endeavor.

this projection of nature certain thinps follow.
projection may be of limited use for many areas of
life and entirely inappropri8te f'or others.

Given

But that
hu~Fn

Science has not

discovered any absolute truths, and any scientist who claims
that science has understands neither the limitation nor the
genius of his science.

Within the limits of-its applicabili"':y

as defined by its projection of nature a science may be valid.
More than that it cannot claim.
The above paragraph deals with individual sciences and
the applicability of their respective projection to various
hu~an proble~s,

but

~ore

can be said about the sciences in
20

general from the standpoint of their underlyinr. metaphysics.
The natural sciences, as we have said, conceive of

bein~

and truth as objectivity of representation and certainty of
representation, respectively, following the lead of Descartes.
Such an understanding literally denies "the seal of beinp.''
to vast areas of hu"llan li:e and experience which cannot be
fully objectified and represented with the certainty de:'llanded by science.

Music, art, poetry, and many other areas of

life are excluded fro"ll the realm of science, but "llore than
that, the understanding of being maintained by science can
not make provision for them even
sense.

~o

exist in a limited

The limited ability of such a metaphysics to deal

with human experience is apparent, then, and such a :'lletaphysics can be accurately evaluated only as one a"Tlong :'TJany
ways of understanding being and truth.
must be f

ir~ly

~he

realization

and clearly established in order that the

significance of the further task of defining precisely the
li~its

of science in dealing with human

proble~s

can be

recof?lized and more deliberately dealt with.
My purpose, then, has clearly not been to say that
science is evil.

It is obviously very valuable 7or man

and to deny this value would be absurd.
~

The purpose has

to say that science as a 11ethod of dealing with hu'Ylan

problems is li"!Jited, and that the limitations of it "TIUst be
clearly defined if we are to avoid "llisusinp it.
Men

~ust

see that the understandinp, of

21

bein~

and truth

'

i~plied

ii',
in science is not appropriate for so\vinp all

hu~an

1!1'

proble:'Ds.

Attempting to use science to solve problems

inappropriate to it can only lead to further difficulties.
j

Theodore Kisiel' s article, "Science, Phenomenology, and

~he

Thinkinf.' of Being," deals at so:'De length with this prob le"!!,
and since he treats it as an evaluation of the sciences, a
discussion of his article is appropriate here.
Kisiel attributes to Heidegger the position that
modern technology, while not being merely applied science,
does rnanif est the hidden character of
such it calls for careful study.

~odern

science.

As

The path +'or its develop-

ment was laid out by modern physics in which the forces
nature were calculated in advance and then
experi.nent.

r:rechnology was

T,O

veri~ied

o~

through

develop as an over+, mani+'est-

ation of the sa11e rnethod of dealing with nature.

It gives

us a procedure by which to deal with nature in order to
acco:npl ish a predetermined p-oal.

'!he goal in this case

is not the aquisition of knowledge as it is in scien:ific
research, but the method is the same in terms of projecting
beforehand what needs to be done and how it can be. done
most efficiently.
The actual goals of most technological pro.jects involve
the control and disposition of "nature" for whatever
predetermined purpose man desires.

Such projects almost

inevitably become highly complex - irnfl.f ine the d i+'f icul ty
of findine,, procuring, and ultimately using all the materials
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.....

needed to build an
for the

acco~plishment

co:nponent~

- and all

auto~obile

of the given end

in the greater system.

One

o~

the thinF-s needed

beco~e

o~

reasons this becomes a problem is that man

mere

the primary
hi~self

is a

natural resource that is necessary to the functioninp of
this

syste~.

Individual

with the fact that the

~en

have little or nothing to do

syste~

is there, but they

drawn into it, trained, and distributed in to the
system which serves it.

~ust

be

"'Tl an power"

In short, man himself who is

involved in the system of "disposinp: the actual into a
system of calculable and reliable components" has become
one of the disposable components of that syste~. 22
The understandinF of being accompanyinp modern techno logy reflects the "method'' discussed above.

BeinF has

become the "stockpile of natural resources" subject to the
demands or needs of modern 1lan. 23 All other ways of understanding being are ignored when this happens.
is a tremendous

i11poveris~1lent

The result

of 11an.

Kisiel suggests that the only way out of the

proble~s

inherent in our current technolopical epoch lies in careful
deliberation on the presuppositions which govern it.
the mathematical, calculative

~ethod

But

necessary to it works

against any .such deliberat,ion since it can ad:nit only
c'ertain types of questions as important and accept only
certain types of evidence as relevant.

Everything else is

syste:natically excluded in order that the ultimate and

23

apparently unquestioned Foal of total

plan~tary do~ination

can be achieved as quickly and efficiently as possible.
So taken

~p

~ethod

with its own

is technology that it tends

to allow even its own presuppositions to be lost.
the :forgetting is forgotten,"

-

a.a

Kisiel puts it.

"Even

24

The danger in all of this is not so much from the socalled "de:nonic" nature of technology, but in the exclusive
way in which it understands the world, being and truth.
The possibility of

co~ing

to a more primordial

of these three things is reduced by the bias

OT

understandin~

the

technological/scientific age, and it is in this that the
danger lies.
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III. SCIENCE AS A FOUNDED MODE OF KNOWING
A. The Dependence of Scientific Knowledge on
Modes of

~ore

Basic

~nowinf

The purpose of this section of the paper is basically
twofold. Using a Heideggerian example, 25 I want first to
demonstrate how it is possible for scientific or theoretical
knowing to develop fro11 'Tlore basic modes of knowing that
exist in

~an

prior to his

develop~ent

as a scientist.

Once that is acco11plished I will try to show what the major
differences are between the two types of knowing and offer
an evaluation of scientific knowinP' in terms of its lil'l'li tations in comparison to the more basic

knowin~

from which

it developed.
Manipulation and use of a tool for the achievement of
some particular end is the general circumstance I will use
as rny example.

My treat:nent of this point will not be a

mere paraphrase of Heidegger's argument (see Being ang

ll!!!.!• pp. 410-414), since much ,of his motivation was to
give a te'Tlporal characterization of everyday involvement
with the world.
here.

That, specifically, is not my concern

The tool may be a hammer and the_ end

~or

which it

is used may be the production of a shoe, but the importance

25

),.

of the example lies in understandinF the

ti:

of relation-

typ~

1f

ship that exists between the user of the tool and the tool
itsel!.

There is more to this relationship than

~erely

I

the user and the tool since they

~ore

than likely exist in

a greater equipmental context as well as a p.reater beinp.
context.

By

shoema~er

who is involved here

equip~ental

context I
~ay

that the

si~ply ~ean

be sitting on a bench

with an anvil under the shoe which he is working on and
nails lying to one side ready for use.

He is aware, in a

sense, of all these things even though his action at this
instant is that of pounding on the shoe.

His

~oal

is par+,

of what is referred to by the phrase "greater being context"
above.

He is working within a particular context of beinp

and beings in the world, but he is working toward the
production of

~o~ething

yet growinf out of it.
a

de~onstration

shoema~er

of

fro~

his immediate context,

This point is used by Heidegger as

te~porality

but it also shows that the

is intimately involved with the

world around him.
part of it.
part of

different

i~,

hi~

the

He is functioning within it and as a

He controls it in.the sense that he changes
but it controls

hi~

from the standpoint

possibilities of being that it offers to
offers

bein~ o~

hi~.

o~

i.e., it

the possibility of making a shoe out

o7

leather

but not out of water.
The fact that the shoemaker is workin,v within <the

26

the

possibilities offered to him by the things

o~

the world

around him indicates a certain attitude on his part toward
the existence or beinp of that world.
world is

no~

by him.

He works on

·na~ure

so~ething ~otally
i~

The beinp of the

or for the

~ost

part

deter~ined

and with it, but according to the

that he finds in it.

It is possible, however, for

that attitude to change or shift to a theoretical or
scienti:ic approach to the world and it is that change which
will elucidate through further development of the example.
Suppose that the shoemaker has more than one hammer on his
work table and that one of them is much heavier than the
others.

He lays the lighter hammer down in order

do some-

~o

thing without it, and then reaches for it to continue the
initial task.

But he has accidentally picked up the much

heavier hammer which he ordinarily would not use for this
work.

I~mediately

He is no longer

his consciousness of his work is

wor~ing

bro~en.

within the context of this original

equipmental totality because his consciousness has shifted
from that context and is now

do~inated

by the heaviness

o~

the ha-nrn er.
At this point it is possible that the shoe11aker would
stop his work and begin to examine the

ha~mer

from this

new perspective, to "know" it from the standpoin;t of its
h~aviness.

Surely he knew it before, he used it

~or

periods of ti:ne, but he now· is cominp to know it .in a
27

long

different way.

The important thing to notice about. this

shift in "ways of knowinf'' is that he now considers it to
have a different kind of beinp.

The tool-ch8racter of' the

ha-n11er has essentially been lost.

The aspect under which

it is studied now could as easily be studied if it were
any other thing whose weight was noticeable
~anner.

~e

i~

a

si~ilar

But this is not the only chanpe that has occured.

place, the position of the

ha~~er

no longer has any real significance.

(the heavy object)
It could be studied

under this aspect here, over there, or anywhere else.
The ha:nm er prior to the shift was involved in a part ic .11-ar
1

equip~ental

end.

totality being used to achieve a particular

None of that has any

m~aninp

now.

It has been

objectified and universalized such that it is freed from
all the characteristics that previousiy were used to
identify it and give it meaning.
At this point the ontological stage has been set for
the definitive shift to the scientific or theoretical
treat~ent

of being.

!he hammer is no

lon~er

a tool, but is

only a thing which can be studied under the theme of
heaviness or weight.
co~pared

That weight can be

cal~ulated

to other heavy things indiscriminately.

and

In fact,

a character has been discovered here that can be applied
~, ~riori

to all physical objects.

The whole of physical

na't.ure can be projected f'or study as the realm of' heavy
bodies or things with measureable weight.
28

The type of'

knowledre that is had when this is done is surely different

fro~

the kind
~hey

that which the

~f

shoe~aker

had of his hammer, and

beinf attributed to things is equally differen+,.

no longer have the individuc:ility they once had - that

was all traded for calculable weipht.
something he did not have before - an
deal with physical nature.
realm of physical

~

priori ability to

literally anything in the

can now be approached with some

natur~

prior knowledge of it.

But man now has

If one adds to this projection

other equally universal and calculable factors such as
~otion,

force, location, and time one has developed some

factors for a science of nature, a physics.

And this is,

in fact, roughly the way :nathematical physics now projects
the realm of physical nature.

Only those aspects of

physical nature that are universalizable and measureable
are considered for study.
established

~

~he

discipline clearly has an

for what it will accept as

knowled~e

of

nature (the factors mentioned are some of the things it
seeks) and subsequently a bias for what really constitutes
,Beine.
B. Consequences of the Derivative Nature of Scientific
iCnowledge
It is precisely this bias for :what constitutes being
that exists as a problem.

The bias is in science as an

integral part of its method but our age seems to have

29

1,

i·

devel9ped a blind respect for science which '.Jn too many
/!'(

cases gives too little importance to significant hu11an
realities because they are "unscientific," i.e., not
l

universalizable or capable of beinr- captured in a for'DUla.
Science is, indeed, an
it develops
other

:ro~

i~portant

i~portant

mode of' lmowinp,

bu~

more basic nodes and exists alongside
modes as well.

xurther light

~ay

be shed on our question about

scientific <nowing by .examining this type of' knowing from
the standpoint of the subject-object dichotomy which
to be implied in it.

see~s

The very nature of the scientific

'llethod carries with it the necessity of objectifyinp the
things of nature that it deals with.
of the

ha~~er

The particularities

we discussed above which Fave it its individ-

uali ty have no sign if ic~nce f'or the physicist,.
be

~he

shoe~a~er's

favorite

ha11~er,

It may

it 11ay have a pood

"feel" and proper balance, but no such facts are relevant
to know it scientifically.

In order to be handled

scienti:ically it :nust be objectified and categorized wit.h
other

si~ilar

objects under a li11ited number of hec:-dinf"s

such as weight, length, density, etc.

As indicated

earlier this treatment is valuable and useful under certain
circu~stances,

the

ha~'ller,

but it is not exhaustive in its treat11ent of

'
and
neither is it necessarily

deal with it.

the~

way to

Shoes, we would all agree, are valuable

for man, and if the shoe11aker knows only the weipht, length

30

and density of his hammer (and not how to use it), then he
cannot make shoes.
Heidegger's treat:nent of this question in
~

is very much to the point.

Bein~

and

He describes the subject-

object dichoto:1ly irnplici t in scienti:"ic knowinf'" as a
superficia 1-f or11al interpretation of the pheno'il en.on of
knowinf the world.~ 6

Man is first and foremost a bein~ who

is in-and-toward-the-world.

To say that 11an is "in-and-

toward" the world is to say that he has, a.s a matt er. o+'
fact, developed with the world and as a part of' it. 27 He
co11es to know himself initially in relation to t.he world;
as he gets to know the world he gets to 'know hi11sel.f.
Man does not get to know the world initially a.s something
that is opposed to hi11 but al11ost as some:hing that is part
Qf himself.

Early in life, for exa11ple, a small child does

not distinguish parts of his body fro:n parts of the world.
~he

relationship r,hat exists between the child and the

world is not, at this stage at least, predominately one of
oppositioa.
The subject-object approach to knowing the world which
is essential to the scientific 1lode remains blind,
Heidegger says, to what is already tacitly i~plied by the
pheno'Tl en on of knowinf" it sel:. 28 Knowinp.- is i +,self' a I"] Ode
~

beillP' for man, and :na.n is first and most pri"l'lordially

a :Beinf"-in-the-world.

Xnowinf" is a 11ode of beinp .!Q'rard

the world as well, and if 1lan's
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knowin~

the world is a

~ode

of his beinp in and toward the world it cannot also

constitute a relationship of isolation betwee!'l a knower
and a world-as-object.
of the

~uower

Knowinr is +.he

beine~together

and the world, not their separation as the

subject-object dichotomy would have it.
If it is the case that scientific knowina necessarily
involves·the subject.-object dichotomy as it has been
discussed here, then it is a
world.

li~ited

mode of knowing the

We cannot deny that in many cases it is useful,

but if it is in any sense seen as the only way of knowing
the world, then it becomes a perversion of man's relationship to his world 'since it ;requires man to be radically
separated from his wor1d.

Such a position would also

necessarily exclude a very wide range of

hu~an

problems

and concerns that do not lend themselves to scientific

objectification or formalization.
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IV.; CONCLUSION: THE SUCCESS AND LI!;l!i:ATIONS

OE RESEARCH

The purpose of this paper

h~s

been to

exa~ine

science

from a perspective that has gone largely ignored by most
scientists as well as philosophers of science.

The

per~pective

itself

di~fers

from other perspectives in that

it concerns

i~self

with understanding the reasons behind

the tre:nendous success of science and with see1<:ing out the
possible limi ~at ions o'f' science as a

:1l

ethod.

Most other

perspectives, as I mentioned earlier, leave these questions
unasked and prefer to deal with questions about the internal
nature of science.

The significance of my examination of science grows
out of the incredible significance of science irt tenns of
the influence it had had onlrnan.

Science embodies a method

of coming to know about the world and a method of dealing
with it that has succeeded in solving the problems it set

for itself with probably
method

~an

has known.

great~regularity

than any other

Through that method science has

achieved amazing progress and it shows no sipns
p9int of slowing down.
'!he problems of defininF 1recisely the
success in science as well as deternining

''

a~

this

;,.

)'!.

1·

on it as a method are intriguing ones and dJ~erve more
I .~·

e'nphasie than they have had.

r
Whatever the reasons for its

neglect now, it was discussed in the Cri+,ique of Pure
Reason by Kant.

I

His understanding of the problem was much

the sane as the one I have traced out here with tne help
of people like Heidegger and Kuhn.

His explanation of

the genius behind scientific success is both insightful
and appropriate to concluding remarks on this problem.
Modern science came into its own, Kant S!iys, when the
scientists realized that their reason was capable of
gaining insight only into those things which it produced
according to its own plan. 29 Reason cannot develop laws
of nature or anything of that kind by accepting "Accidental
observations, Tiade in obedience to no thought-out plan, •••• .,30
!rhe student of nature 11ust approach nature "not in the
character of a pupil who listens to

everythin~

that the

teacher chooses to say, but as an appointed judf'e who
compels the witnesses
self' for:nulat ed. 1131

f~o

answer

~uest

ions which he has him-

Heidegger would cal 1 this activity

of the scientist who forces nature to answer his own
questions rather accepting 11erely random data the process
o: projection.
case was

wor~inr

Xuhn would say that the scientist in this
within a previously

acce~ted

paradign.

But all three of them are talking abont the sa:ne thing.
Science beca11e successful because it stopped "just· lookin~"
34

at nature and began to interrogate nature from a particular
standpoint in an

atte~pt

to get just

this perspective and nothing else.

!hi!

infor~ation

~herein

from

·1ay the genius

of science and the explanation o! its steady progress.

It

is '!'or this reason that .Kant could use the phrase "the
secure path of a science. 1132 ~cience was on a secure path
bec<-0.use it no longer depended on rando11 p-roping. 33

.

This insight also provides us with a key for deternining the

li~itations

on science as a method.

It was success-

ful and secure because it adopted a well-defined perspective
and sought answers to only certain questions that it had
chosen.

But any question that lay outside the scope of that

perspective clearly could not be answered by that science.
This point was mr=de earlier in the discussion of physics.
Physics is the science that studies those things

co~in?

under the heading of "spatio-temporal kine~ic 111agnitudes." 34
If a thing does not :it under that headinf, physics is not
interested in it.

This is the

li~itation

of physics and of

the natural sciences toge;her, but it is also their genius.
The sciences have not been able to achieve objective
truth as people

li~e

Scheffler claim since their knowledre

is applicable only wi-:.hin the ranf'e of their inii:ial
perspective or projection of nature.
ranre the knowledge they achieve

~

But, within that
reliable.

The only point remaining to be e11phasized concerns +,he
appropriateness of scientific projections for dealinF with

35

I

hu:nan problems.

lf so:ne aspect of hu'llan

li;~ finds itself
i!I.

excluded fro.-n the projection of a given science or the
collective projections of all the sciences, then that area
I
must be dealt with by so~e means other than science.
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